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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is based upon Sec. 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C A. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the breach of contract claim when the 
Defendants admitted its breach and damages remained disputed between the parties. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation claims when the Defendants admitted conducting defective title 
research and the trial court adopted a standard of care in open conflict with 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company 666 P.2d. 302 (Utah, 
1983). 
3. Whether the landowner's acquiescence in public use of a private road is 
"abandonment" under 72-5-104, U.C.A. (Proposed Jury Instructions 5, 6 and 7. 
4. Whether seasonal use of a private road will suffice to establish "abandonment to 
public use" under 72-5-104, U.C.A. (Proposed Jury Instruction No. 9). 
5. Whether gates, of whatever variety, across a private way constitute, as a matter of 
law, interruption of continuous use under 72-5-104, U.C. A. (Jury Instruction No. 33). 
6. Whether the jury's verdict is supported by clear and convincing evidence of 
continuous use by the public. 
7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to confine the scope of the prescriptive 
highway to the scope of historic use which created the prescriptive highway. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The propriety of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Wycalisv. Guardian 
Title of Utah 780 P.2d. 821, 824. Jury verdicts are reviewed for sufficiency of evidence 
under the applicable burden of proof. Von Hake v. Thomas 705 P.2d. 766 (Utah, 1985) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29,1999, Roger Chapman, Nile Chapman and the Eugene Harmston Trust 
1 
("Plaintiffs", collectively) filed their Complaint in the Eighth District Court seeking 
declaratory relief against Uintah County. (R: 3-21) Plaintiffs sought a determination that 
a land route across their respective properties (Hereafter, "The Road") was a private and not 
public road. (R:12) On May 17, 1999, Uintah County filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
asserting that the subject land route had become a public road by Dedication and 
Abandonment pursuant to Sec. 72-5-104, U.C.A. (R:90-96) 
OnMarch24,2000, by their Second Amended Complaint, (R:442-476)theChapmans 
made claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation against Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") and Basin Land Title and Abstract, Inc. 
("Basin") arising from the issuance of Commonwealth Title Policy No. 207-899161 ("The 
Policy"). On July 26, 2000, Commonwealth and Basin filed their Joint Answer to the 
Second Amended Complaint. (R.489-497) These Defendants, did not assert the Policy's 
mandatory arbitration provisions as an affirmative defense. (Ibid) Moreover, the Defendants 
never sought an order under Sec. 78-3 la-4, U.C. A., compelling mandatory arbitration under 
Sec. 14 of the Title Policy. (SEE: Index to Record: Vol IV] 
On October 6,2000, Commonwealth and Basin, having concluded written discovery 
and depositions, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (R:517-63 7) Plaintiffs responded 
with affidavits and records on October 31, 2000. (R:656-752) Commonwealth submitted 
rebuttal affidavits. (R:757-770; 774-783) On December 19, 2000, the Court granted 
summary judgment to Commonwealth and Basin. (Hereafter, "Commonwealth Judgment"). 
This judgment was not certified as final under Rule 54, U.R.C.P. The trial court signed the 
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Commonwealth Judgment on March 5,2001, but never mailed a copy of the judgment to any 
of the parties or their counsel. (R: 802-808) 
On September 4 and 5, 2001, a jury trial was conducted on the Plaintiffs' claims 
against Uintah County. (R: 1079-1081) A Stipulation in Limine was submitted in advance 
of trial. (R:930-931) The jury found that The Road had become a public road pursuant to 
72-5-104, U.C.A., and that the period of "continuous use" was 1960-1998. (R:1082) On 
September 28, 2001, the Eighth District entered its Order of Judgment. (R: 1143-1145) 
(Hereafter, "County Judgment") This appeal followed as to both the Commonwealth and 
County judgments. (R: 1148-1149) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Commonwealth Judgment 
The Road at issue is located in Sec. 33, T7S, R21E, SLM and Sees. 4 and 5, T8S, 
R21E, SLM, all within Uintah County. In August, 1997, Nile and Roger Chapman 
("Chapmans") contracted with Harold Fredrickson ("Fredrickson") to purchase the 
Fredrickson property in Sec. 33. (R:523, Para. 1) Prior to the closing, the Chapmans engaged 
Commonwealth, through its local agent Basin Abstract, for a policy of title insurance. 
(R:523, Para. 2) The Chapmans did not deliver special written instructions to 
Basin/Commonwealth which would require Basin/Commonwealth to undertake any research 
in excess of ordinary standards. (R: 524, Para. 3) 
Upon receiving the Chapmans' request, Ms. Joyce Gardiner, Basin's licensed title 
agent (R:719, Lns. 1-3), assigned the title research to Ms. Wanda Merkley, an unlicensed 
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title researcher. Both Ms. Gardner and Ms. Merkley admitted knowing that a "Utah Class 
D Road" was a road open to public use and, thus, a "public road" held by the County. 
(Merkley / R:681-682; Gardiner / R:695, Lns. 1-20) This was an important reference, since 
"road" was the triggering word for further research under guidelines issued to Basin by 
Commonwealth. (R:707, Lns. 17-25) Indeed, Commonwealth's Manual of Procedure for 
Title Policies, kept in Ms. Gardiner's office, mandated detailed inspection of all recorded 
maps, deeds or documents - including, if necessary, a physical inspection of the subject 
property - when there might be a road or access issue. (R:703, Lns. 4-11; 704, Lns. 3-14) 
Ms. Merkley went to the Recorder's Office and, inter alia, pulled the Tract Sheet for 
Sec. 33. (R: 660) Ms. Merkley immediately observed a stamped notice put on the Tract 
Sheet for Sec. 33 by the Uintah County Recorder, which stated: 
RESOLUTION: UINTAH COUNTY COMMISSION TO WHOM IT MAY 
CONCERN: CLASS "D" ROADS IN UINTAH COUNTY RECORDED 
APRIL 22, 1992, BOOK 527, PAGE 211. (R: 660) 
Ms. Merkley also observed a stamped notice of the recording of Uintah County's 
Class B & D Road Map. (R:683-684) Ms. Merkley scanned the recorded D Road 
Resolution. (R: 719, Lns. 1-3) Ms. Merkley was uncertain whether she did, in fact, review 
the recorded Uintah County B & D Road Map. In specified colors, this map denoted the 
various federal, state, city and county and Class D roads within Uintah County. (R:702, Lns. 
4-20) Both the resolution adopting the amended map, and the amended map, would then be 
recorded. (Ibid) Ms. Gardiner knew that a copy of the then current B&D Road Map hung 
in the hallway between the Recorder's lobby and the "vault" where records were kept. (R: 
4 
702, Lns. 4-8) A person researching land titles would, perforce, walk past the Uintah 
County B&D Road Map when title searching. As relevant here, the 1996 Uintah County 
B&D Road Map denoted The Road as a Uintah County Class B Road. (R: Pg. 667) 
In the opinion of Ms. Gardiner, these stamped notices and recorded resolutions and 
maps were sufficient cause for a title searcher to perform additional research. (R:690, Lns. 
16-24) Ms. Gardiner testified that Ms. Merkley was required to not only review all recorded 
documents found in the research process but also to report to her all such documents found 
to be recorded. (R:708, Ln.8 - 706, Ln.9) This included Ms. Merkley's duty to review the 
County B&D Road Map to determine County maintenance of the road, if any, on a parcel 
to be insured. (R:703, Ln-23-702, Ln.3) Without such a search, and report, Ms. Gardiner 
could not properly create an insurable chain of title nor an appropriate list of exclusions. 
(R:693,Ln. 18 - 792, Ln.24) If Ms. Merkley had listed the D Road Resolution on her "chain 
sheet5\ Ms. Gardiner would have required further research and copying by Ms. Merkley. 
(R:708,Ln.25-707,Ln.l6) 
Although admitting the D Road Resolution and the Uintah County B&D Road Map 
were public records, (R:681) Ms. Merkley did not then make a copy of either document. 
(R:683, Lns. 12-19) More importantly, on her "chain sheet" containing the list of public 
records found by her, Ms. Merkley nowhere indicated having found record reference to the 
D Road Resolution, D Road Map or other road documents. (R:680; 656-658; R:709, Lns. 
709,Ln. 12-708, Ln. 11). In short, Ms. Merkley never advised Ms. Gardiner that recorded 
documents described a Class D and/or Class B Road on the subject property. 
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Ironically, the absence of a reference in Ms. Merkley9s chain sheet to the D Road 
Resolution did not alarm Ms. Gardiner. Ms. Merkley had been given power to determine the 
relevancy of a recorded document. (R:700,Ln.5-699, Ln. 22) If Ms. Merkley deemed the 
document irrelevant, then she was not required to report her discovery or review of the 
document - or even its existence - to Ms. Gardiner. (Ibid) 
Ms. Gardner did not, herself, review any recorded documents. Instead, she 
constructed the Schedule B Exclusions based solely upon Ms. Merkley's incomplete report 
of her title search. (R:697, Lns. 9-15) She drafted that language of Schedule B, Para. 18, 
which read identically in both the Commitment for Title Insurance and later the Title Policy 
issued to the Chapmans: 
This policy does not insure against loss or damaged (and the Company will not 
pay costs, attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: ...18. 
Property is not located on a county road and Company DOES NOT INSURE 
ACCESS. (Capitals in Original) (R: Pgs. 524, Para. 5; 524-25, Para. 9) 
To the Chapmans, this language meant that The Road was a private road. (R:726, 
Lns. 3-4) In 1998, relying upon the Title Policy, the Chapmans erected a gate across The 
Road. Uintah County informed the Chapmans the road was a public road by virtue of the 
D Road and B Road designations. (R: 667) In reliance upon Ms. Gardiner's statement, the 
Chapmans initiated this litigation. (R:725,Lns. 16-22) 
The Uintah County Judgment 
Plaintiffs' properties had originally been homesteaded and patented in 1956. At the 
time of homestead entry, there was a "two track trail through the sagebrush" in the middle 
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of Sec. 33. (TR:271, L1017). The properties were not fenced. In accordance with 
homestead requirements, the Harmston and Fredrickson properties were fenced, water was 
brought from the Green River and crops were sown. (TR:273,L10-16) Messrs. Fredrickson 
and Harmston, working cooperatively, jointly moved the "two track trail" to the western edge 
of Sec. 33, and over a course in Sec. 4, which is roughly where The Road exists today. 
(TR:273,L 17-274,L4) Gates, made of poles and barbed-wire, were installed across The Road 
on both the southern and northern entrances to the properties. (TR:274,L513) 
In 1960, the U.S. Department of Fish& Game ("USF&G") created the Ouray National 
Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge"). (TR:92,Ln24-25) The Refuge was bisected by the Green River. 
(TR.Ex. 2) On the western side there are the Refuge offices, shops and informational booths. 
(TR:95,L5-14) The eastern side - mat side relevant here - has been largely undeveloped for 
public use. Water pumps and water quality monitoring stations were installed in and south 
of Wyasket Bottom but not near Plaintiffs' properties. (TR: 110,L21-111,L.4) The Refuge 
owns Johnson Bottom, north of Plaintiffs' properties, in which it constructed ponds for 
migrating waterfowl. (TR:96,L.22-25) The Refuge owns "Bull Durham Flats", situated 
between Plaintiffs' properties, which remains undeveloped. (TR:97,L8-10). On the eastern 
side, the Refuge has never constructed public use areas: i.e., picnic sites, interpretive booths 
or self-guided touring routes. (TR: 109,L7-110,L2) Parking spots built in Wyasket Bottom, 
itself, have been abandoned by the Refuge. (TR:110,L8-20) Nearly 90% of all Refuge 
violations, including poaching, occur on the western side thus indicating the proportion of 
public use of the Refuge. (TR: 113,L. 12-19) 
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Neither Harmston nor Fredrickson objected to Refuge personnel traveling The Road 
to accomplish Refuge business. (TR:275,L18-275,L3) Similarly, the Chapmans did not. 
After installing a locked gate in 1998, the Chapmans provided a key for the lock to the 
Refuge manager, Mr. Alonso. (TR:107,L.18-108,L.ll) 
In 1964, Fredrickson and Harmston removed their southern gate across The Road but 
retained the northern gate. (TR:282,L10-17) In 1974, oil activity occurred in Johnson 
Bottom, and further north in Bohemian Bottom. Harmston and Fredrickson granted an 
easement to Gulf Oil Corp, in exchange for which, Gulf Oil improved The Road and 
installed cattle guards at north and south ends. (TR:276,L.4-278,L. 15) "No Trespassing" 
signs were mounted on the ends and both sides of the cattle guards. Although repeatedly 
torn down, these signs were continuously reposted by Harmstons and Fredrickson. 
(TR:283,L17-284,L.10) 
Despite the easement, however, Gulf Oil's traffic did not generally occur over The 
Road. Instead, drilling rigs, support equipment and even work crews accessed Johnson 
Bottom by better, higher and drier roads: to wit, Deadman's Bench Road and Johnson 
Bottom Road running from USH 45 (The Bonanza Highway). These are north of Plaintiffs' 
properties (TR:285,L3-287,L5) 
The Road was never maintained by Uintah County during any period before the filing 
of this litigation. (TR:278,L 16-20) Mr. Gene Nyberg, county grader operator 1952-59 and 
1965-72, never performed maintenance north of the Louis Hall Ranch, located south of 
Plaintiffs' properties. (TR:75,L.2-23; Tr.Ex. 2) In the late 1970fs, the Refuge constructed 
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a "dugway" on BLM land north of Plaintiffs' properties and ran a grader over The Road for 
its private use. (TR:209,L.1-16) 
The absence of maintenance, and its proximity to the Green River, gives The Road 
its most notable - and memorable - feature. It is a "bog hole": frequently flooded by 
thunderstorms, muddy from water drainage and impassable by both mud and water. 
Gates had been constructed across various portions of The Road during the period 
1960 through 1990. In addition to the Harmston/Fredrickson "livestock gates" [1960-1974], 
the Refuge constructed gates at both ends of Bull Durham Flats beginning in 1976 and 
continuing thereafter. (TR:211,L. 12-19) At trial, Uintah County called 10 witnesses to 
establish continuous use, whose testimonies are summarized elsewhere in this Brief. 
Trial Exhibits 4 and 5 
At trial, the Plaintiffs sought admission of Trial Exhibit 4 (Gulf Oil Easement) and 
Trial Exhibit 5 (1996 Fredrickson Easement to Chandler & Associates). The Court denied 
admission of both exhibits, holding that Plaintiffs were required to prove actual and specific 
use of the easements by Gulf Oil and Chandler as a condition to admissibility of the 
documents. The Court held that, with specific proof of specific use for specific purposes, 
the easements were irrelevant to trial issues. (TR:305,L23-306,L23) 
The Jury Instructions 
The trial court refused Plaintiffs' Proposed Instructions 5, 6, 7 and 9, dealing, 
respectively, with permissive use of a private road (R: 953), four elements for "dedication" 
under Sec. 72-5-104 (R:952), the definition of "thoroughfare" set forth in Morris v. Blunt 
9 
161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah, 1916), including the provision that use without objection by the 
landowner did not constitute "dedication" (R: 951), and seasonal use of roads by hunters and 
fishermen (R:949), respectively. 
In addition, and during closing argument before the jury, the Trial Court gave 
Instruction No. 33, advising the jury that the presence of a gate across The Road was a mere 
factual issue relating to "continuity of use" but not a legal impediment to dedication. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. COMMONWEALTH ADMITTED LIABILITY FOR BREACHING 
THE TERMS OF THE POLICY, AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS FOR SUCH BREACH WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiffs Chapman claimed that Commonwealth breached the contract of title 
insurance by failing to identify, and thereby exclude, the Uintah County Class D Road 
Resolution relating to The Road. Commonwealth and Basin jointly admitted liability for this 
claim at the December 19, 2000, hearing on their request for summary judgment. As the 
Commonwealth judgment, written by Commonwealth's counsel, clearly stated: 
Fn. 1: In this case, Commonwealth has acknowledged liability under the 
policy on the basis that there is a county road which constitutes an 
encumbrance which was not excluded from coverage under the policy. 
Commonwealth acknowledges that it has liability pursuant to Section 6(b)(ii). 
Commonwealth has stipulated that this dismissal is without prejudice to 
Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to Section 6(b)(ii) of the Title Policy. 
(Commonwealth Judgment; Pg. 3) {Emphasis Supplied) 
Pursuant to Sec. 6(b)(ii) of the Policy, Commonwealth could either pay applicable 
damages or defend against the County's claim. The nature, amount and extent of these 
money damages remained a disputed issue between the Chapmans and Commonwealth. 
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Commonwealth denied any duty to defend Chapmans' title, and asserted its liability was only 
for the diminution in value of the entire parcel by the presence of a public road. The 
Chapmans asserted that Commonwealth was liable not only for diminished value but also the 
full costs of litigating the road issue with Uintah County. Significantly, neither party sought 
summary judgment on the amount, nature or type of the damages. Moreover, the trial court 
never made any findings or conclusions on the nature of the Chapmans' damages arising 
from Commonwealth's admitted breach of the Title Policy. 
Instead, the trial court simply dismissed, with prejudice, the entirety of the Chapmans' 
breach of contract claim under the conclusion that a breach had not occurred! This was clear 
error, requiring reversal of the Commonwealth judgment.. 
n. COMMONWEALTH WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION 
Perhaps, the trial court believed that dismissal was appropriate in order to allow 
arbitration of the Chapmans' claim pursuant to Sec. 14 of the Title Policy. Even there, 
however, the trial court was in error. Commonwealth and Basin had waived that right. 
When a contract has an arbitration provision, a trial court has two alternatives. First, 
upon timely assertion of the arbitration duty, the trial court has a mandatory duty to stay all 
further proceeding pending conclusion of the arbitration. Sees. 78-31a-4(l), 78-31a-4(3), 
U.C.A.; McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah 20 P.3d. 901,904 (Utah, 2001) [court has 
no discretion but must compel arbitration and stay further judicial proceedings] In Utah, the 
existence of the arbitration agreement does not oust the court of jurisdiction over the claim, 
but it does remove the controversy from judicial action pending conclusion of the arbitration. 
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Second, if the arbitration duty is not timely asserted, the trial court may deny delaying 
proceedings based upon its conclusion that arbitration has been waived. The right to 
arbitration can be waived - even in those states where arbitration does not oust the court's 
jurisdiction over the claim. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co. 636 P.2d. 1070,1074 
(Utah, 1981) Even in those states where arbitration is "jurisdictional", the right to 
arbitration may be waived by conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. Cordillera 
Corp. v. Heard 200 Colo. 72, 612 P.2d. 92, 93 (Colo. 1980); ReidBurton Const, Inc. v. 
Carpenters Dist. Council 614 F.2d. 698, 702 (10th Cir., 1980) [defendants waived right to 
arbitrate because they had participated in numerous hearings, pretrial conferences, motions 
and other proceedings before seeking arbitration]. "Conduct inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate" includes both participation in discovery (not authorized in arbitration proceedings) 
as well as seeking and obtaining summary judgment. 
We therefore adopt the principle that waiver of a right of arbitration must be 
based on both a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice.. .Further, consistent with 
the policy consideration (encouraging arbitration), any real detriment is 
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Utah 833 P.2d. 356, 360 (Utah 1992) 
Commonwealth had not pleaded the arbitration provision as an "affirmative defense" 
under Rules 8(c) and 12(h), U.R.C.P., and therefore waived the defense. Olpinv. GroveFin. 
Co. 521 P.2d. 1221 (Utah, 1974) Commonwealth never sought an order under Sec. 78-3 la-
4, U.C.A., compelling arbitration. Instead, Commonwealth actively participated in both 
written discovery and depositions of Ms. Gardiner, Ms. Merkley and the Chapmans. Based 
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on these depositions, Commonwealth and Basis successfully, albeit erroneously, obtained 
summary judgment dismissing all the Chapmans' claims. As held in Harting v. Barton 6 
P.3d. 91, 96 (Wash.Appeals, Div. 3, 2000) (non-jurisdictional state), this was suflEicient 
conduct constituting waiver of the right to arbitration. 
The trial court never made conclusions on whether waiver of arbitration had occurred, 
nor did the trial court suspend proceedings to allow for arbitration. Instead, the trial court 
summarily dismissed the entirety of Plaintiffs' contract claim against Commonwealth. 
Ironically, this dismissal was both "with prejudice" and "without prejudice".1 Whichever, 
the dismissal was clearly erroneous and must be reversed by this Court. 
HI. PLAINTIFFS SATISFIED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFEAT 
DISMISSAL OF THEIR SIXTH AND SEVENTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
A. Governing Rules for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment may be granted only upon the absence of a genuine factual 
controversy and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, U.R.C.P.; Draper City 
v. Estate of Bernardo 888 P.2d. 1097, 1099 (Utah, 1995) WM. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
National Resources Co. 627 P.2d. 56, 59 (Utah, 1981) 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the 
credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. 
Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any 
1
 The Commonwealth Judgment, Fn. 1, states that "Commonwealth stipulated for 
dismissal without prejudice". There is no record that Plaintiffs ever joined in such 
stipulation "without prejudice". The text of the Judgment dismissed all claims "with 
prejudice". 
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entitled to prevail. (Draper at ?g. 1101) 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the facts asserted by all parties are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. 793 P.2d. 415 (Utah. Ct. App. 
1990). All inferences which may be drawn from the facts asserted must be inferred in favor 
of the non-moving party. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Garfield County 811 P.2d. 184 
(Utah, 1991); Winegarv. FroererCorp. 813 P.2d. 104 (Utah, 1991) 
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in negligence cases. 
Williams v. Melby 699 P.2d. 723 (Utah, 1985) 
...summary judgment (in a negligence case) is inappropriate unless the 
applicable standard of care is 'fixed by law9..(citations omitted)... and 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances.... Wycalisv. Guardian Title 780 P.2d. 821, 
824 (Utah Ct.App., 1989) cert denied 789 P.2d. 33 (Utah, 1990). 
The trial court, in numerous instances, failed to apply these wel] -established rules, 
resulting in the necessity to reverse the trial court's dismissal of the Chapmans' claims.. 
B. The Court's First Error: Plaintiffs' Duty to Present Expert Testimony 
The trial court's first error was its conclusion that Plaintiffs, the non-moving party, 
had a duty to present expert testimony on the standard of care for title insurance. This was 
clear error, since it was Commonwealth and Basin, as the moving parties, who bore the 
burden to establish any entitlement to summary judgment. Draper (Supra). 
Ironically, the Chapmans, Commonwealth and Basin relied upon the same factual 
evidence regarding the standard of care in performing a title search: to wit, the deposition 
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evidence regarding the standard of care in performing a title search: to wit, the deposition 
testimonies of Joyce Gardiner and Wanda Merkley, toether with Commonwealth's Manual 
of Procedure governing road issues on subject parcels. Thus, the trial court was presented 
the Defendants' standard requiring examination and copying of all recorded documents 
relating to roads on a subject parcel. Commonwealth's admission of breaching the policy -
i.e., failing to disclose and exclude a public road shown by recorded documents - clearly 
established breach of Commonwealth's self-imposed standard of care. Neither 
Commonwealth nor Basin, themselves, submitted any independent expert testimony of their 
own. Thus, the factual standard established by Ms. Gardiner remained unchallenged. Even 
if challenged, there remained a conflict between Ms. Gardiner's admission of improper title 
search and Commonwealth's naked assertion that the search was proper. Accordingly, 
Commonwealth, not the Chapmans, had failed to sustain their burden of proof on summary 
judgment. It was clear error by the trial court to conclude otherwise. 
C. The Trial Court's Second Error: The Standard of Care 
An action against a title insurer for negligent title research is one sounding in 
professional negligence. Breck v. Moore 910 P.2d. 599 (Alaska, 1996); Laurence v. 
Kruckmeyer 605 P.2d. 466 (Arz.App., Div. 2; 1979); White v. Western Title Ins. Co. 710 
P.2d. 309 (Cal. 1985); Malinakv. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho 661 P.2d. 12 (Mont. 1983). 
Utah follows this general rule. Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall 795 P.2d. 650 
(Utah, 1990); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company 666 P.2d. 302 
(Utah, 1983). Such negligence actions are a blend of both contract and tort law: to wit, 
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privity of contract2; the duty; the breach3; and, damages. 
In Wycalis (Supra), this Court held that in title insurance negligence cases the 
standard of care is "fixed by law" when established either by a governing statute or by prior 
appellate decisions. (780 P.2d. at Pg. 825) Sec. 31A-20-110(l), U.C.A, sets a specific 
standard for title searches, the breach of which would be negligence per se\ 
No title insurance policy may be written until the title insurer or its agent has 
conducted a reasonable search and examination of the title and has made a 
determination of the insurability of title under sound underwriting principles. 
This statutory duty is not premised upon special instructions being given to the title insurer 
by the customer. It is imposed on each and every title insurer issuing a title policy. Being 
a statutory mandate, it is not waivable by private agreements between the parties. 
Additionally, the Utah standard of care for title research and reporting to the client 
was also established in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company 666 
P.2d. 302 (Utah, 1983) Citing Jardine v. Brunswick Corp. 18 Utah 2d. 378, 381, 423 P.2d. 
659, 662 (1967), the Court said: 
2
 Whether abstractor or title insurer, the duty extends only to those who have 
contracted for the issuance of the title policy or abstract. SEE: Ruiz v. Garcia 850 P.2d. 
972 (N.M., 1993); Luce v. State Title Agency 950 P.2d. 159 (Ariz.App., Div. 1; 1997). 
3
 Utah distinguishes the title policy from a commitment for title, holding that the 
latter is merely a statement of the grounds on which the title insurer is willing to issue a 
policy. Culp Construction (Supra at Page 653). These distinctions are moot here, since 
Para. 18, Sec. 2, Schedule B was contained in both the title commitment and the title 
policy. 
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...(a casual statement cannot be grounds for misrepresentation)...if, however, 
the information is given in the capacity of one in the business of supplying 
such information, that care and diligence should be exercised which is 
compatible with the particular business or profession involved. Those who 
deal with such persons do so because of the advantages which they expect to 
derive from this special competence. The law, therefore, may well predicate 
on such a relationship the duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of 
the information (given)....Commonwealth contends that it owed no duty to 
Cape Trust (the assignee) to make accurate representations. We disagree. It 
is true that Commonwealth was not in privity with Cape Trust and had no duty 
to sign the acknowledgment or give Cape Trust any information concerning 
the lots. But when Commonwealth signed the acknowledgment, a duty arose 
to use reasonable care to not mislead one whom Commonwealth knew would 
justifiably rely upon the facts as represented. (Emphasis Supplied) (666 P.2d. 
at Pg. 305) 
The rule in Christenson arises from the more general rule that licensed title insurers 
are engaged in a profession affected with a public interest. SEE: Bank of California, N.A. 
v. First American Title Ins. Co. 826 P.2d. 1126 (Alaska, 1992) Title agents are licensed, 
after examination, by the State of Utah, pursuant to 31A-20-110(l); 31A-23-308, U.C.A.) 
Their standard of conduct is of a higher order, and obedience to such standards given stricter 
scrutiny. In Utah, "professionals" - which can arguably include licensed title agents - may 
reasonably foresee that their clients will rely upon the summations, lists and advice given to 
their clients. Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell 713 P.2d. 55,60 (Utah, 1986) Indeed, 
the court in Christenson also cited Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. O Malley 
Lumber Co. 14 Ariz.App. 486,484 P.2d. 639, 645 (1971) [when the title company chose to 
speak it had a duty to exercise reasonable care in making representations about presently 
ascertainable facts] 
Here, the Commonwealth Judgment made an erroneous conclusion on the standard 
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of care applicable to the search: 
Para. 17: Neither Commonwealth nor Basin have a duty to the customer when 
issuing a title insurance policy to list all matters of the public record that will 
affect title. 
This is a clear error of law in direct conflict with Christenson and Sec. 31A-20-110(l). 
Accordingly, the Commonwealth judgment must be reserved. 
C. The Court's Third Error: Representations - Title Reporting vs. Abstracting 
The trial court's third error was its determination that the title insurer could limit the 
scope of its disclosure to the customer: 
Para. 18: Neither Commonwealth nor Basin have a duty to report the status of 
title when issuing a policy for title insurance. 
The Commonwealth Judgment does not define "status of title" in the context of this ruling. 
Certainly, a title insurer is hired by the insured to render a report of recorded documents. 
Under Christenson (Supra) that report must be accurate, and soundly based on the public 
records "fundable" by the title insurer. Thus, if "status of title" is merely a "laundry list" of 
publicly recorded documents, then this ruling is clearly erroneous. 
If the term, as used in the Judgment, means "conclusions on the legal import of the 
documents", then the ruling may, or may not, be accurate in the context of this case. An 
"abstractor" reviews recorded documents, interprets their legal significance and reports his 
analysis to the "client". American Title Ins, Co. v. M-H Enterprises 815 P.2d. 1219 (Okla. 
1991) Obviously, the abstractor has a higher duty of care than a title insurer, since the 
abstractor renders legal conclusions regarding publicly recorded documents. Under Utah 
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law, title insurers, although not abstractors per se, may voluntarily assume the role of an 
abstractor: and thereby subject themselves to the higher duty standard of an abstractor. 
...it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent, Richmond Title, may have 
assumed the duties and responsibilities of an abstractor when it received the 
escrow instructions from Tower's agent which explicitly directed Richmond 
not to transfer funds unless the title status remained the same as stated on the 
commitment. (Emphasis Supplied) {Culp at Pg. 655) 
Elevation from title insurer to abstractor is not dependent upon specific written 
instructions or express requests from the customer. Culp nowhere contains such a ruling 
even though that case did, admittedly, involve written instructions. Instead, the elevation 
occurs when the title insurer proceeds, gratis or otherwise, to make legal conclusions about 
the public records as opposed to merely listing all those documents. So long as the title 
insurer can expect the insured to rely upon the statement, then the title insurer is required to 
make an accurate statement. Christenson (Supra). 
Here, the language of Ms. Gardiner's written statement in Schedule B, Para. 18 was 
undisputed: "...(the) Property is not located on a county road....". The Chapmans assumed 
this statement was made after a reasonable search of publicly recorded documents. The 
Chapmans further assumed it was made as part of the "insurable title" duties under Sec. 31A-
20-110(1), U.C.A. The Chapmans had no idea that the statement was made: (1) by Ms. 
Gardiner in complete ignorance of the recorded D Road Resolution; (2) which Ms. Merkley 
had discovered and copied; but, (3) which Ms. Merkley, having authority but no legal 
training to so conclude, determined was "irrelevant" to the Chapman title. 
Thus, in the context of this case, the issue of Para. 18, Schedule B being, or not being, 
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a "conclusionary statement regarding the legal import of publicly recorded documents" was 
a question for the jury. That determination would involve a factual question of Ms. 
Gardiner's intent, knowledge and background at the time of making die statement. The trial 
court, on summary judgment, lacked power and authority to make these determinations. 
(Draper at Pg. 1101) Having failed to limit its fact-finding role, and making unfounded 
legal conclusions on Commonwealth's standard of care in reporting to the Chapmans, the 
trial court's dismissal of the Chapmans' claims must be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiffs9 Proposed Instructions Nos. 5, 6 and 7 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 5 declared that permissive use of the road - i.e., 
use at the consent or acquiescence of the private landowner - does not constitute grounds for 
abandonment and dedication under Sec. 72-5-104. Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 6 
therefore listed 4 elements required to be proven under 72-5-104, U.C.A. The trial court's 
Jury Instruction 23 (R: 1093) listed only 3 elements. Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 7 
was a direct quote from Morris v. Blunt 161 P. 1127,1131 (Utah 1916) on this same issue. 
The difference between Plaintiffs' proposed instructions, and those given by the court, 
arises from Heber City v. Simpson 942 P.2d. 307, 310-311 (Utah, 1997). 
(The definition in Morris v. Blunt) establishes four general requirements: (i) 
There must be passing or travel; (ii) the use must be by the public; (iii) use by 
permission does not constitute use as a public thoroughfare; and, (iv) (before 
the road) becomes public in character the owner of the land must consent to 
the change. We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the language 
of the statute the requirement that the owner must consent to die dedication. 
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Draper City 888 P.2d. at 1099 (citing LeoM. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranches 639 P.2d. 211, 213 (Utah 1981); Thurman v. Byram 626 P.2d. 447, 
449 (Utah 1981). We have, however, maintained the permissive use 
element 
LeoM. Bertagnole, however, does not contain an independent ruling eliminating the 
issue of "landowner's consent or acquiescence". Instead, Bertagnole merely quoted from 
the decision in Thurman v. Byram 626 P.2d. at Pg. 449, which said: 
It is not necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer the road to the public as 
contended by defendants. Section 27-12-89 (now 72-5-104) deems a 
dedication to the public as matter of law when the required public use is 
established. See Wilson v. Hull 7 Utah 90, 92 24 P. 799, 800 (1890), where 
we said: "The intent of the owner of the land to dedicate may be inferred from 
his acquiescence in its continual use as a road by the public." This language 
was quoted with approval in Schettlerv. LynchlZ Utah 305,64 P. 955 (1901). 
The Court's error in Thurman was its reliance upon two Supreme Court decisions 
which pre-dated Moms v. Blunt (Supra) Morris v. Blunt specifically held: 
A "thoroughfare" is a place or way through which there is passing or travel. 
It becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the public have a general right of 
passage. Under the identically worded predecessor statute (to Sec. 27-12-89), 
the highway, even though it be over privately owned ground, will be deemed 
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when the public has continuously 
used it as a thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, but such use must be by the 
public. Use under private right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare is laid out 
or used as a private way, its use, however long, as a private way, does not 
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the public also make(s) use of it, 
without objection from the owner of the land, will not make it a public way. 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
In short, Thurman and Heber City, while acknowledging the preeminence of Morris 
v. Blunt, nonetheless relied upon two earlier decisions which are directly contradicted - if not 
overruled - by the holding in Morris v. Blunt. The correct rule appears to be, therefore, that 
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Sec. 72-4-105 has four elements: that fourth element being that use by ithe public was without 
consent of or acquiesence by the landowner. This conclusion is buttressed by the complete 
absence of any case law or statute in Utah requiring the owner of private land to "barricade" 
the boundaries of his property in order to preserve the private nature of the property. In the 
absence of such a duty, then acquiescence in public use is not considered "abandonment" of 
private rights in the land. 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 9 
To satisfy Sec. 72-4-105, the evidence at trial must establish: (1) public use 
".. .whenever, and for whatever reason, the public may have need..." to travel The Road; and, 
(2) a continuing need to use The Road over a ten year period. What happens, however, when 
the need is only "seasonal" (i.e, during hunting season) and there is no demonstrated need, 
or use, at any other time of the year? 
Other States have held that "seasonal use" - and specifically for hunting, fishing and 
recreational purposes - is not sufficient to establish dedication by abandonment.£wafl v. 
Stenberg 168 Mont. 63,541 P.2d. 60,63 (1975) [occasional use by hunter and by sightseers 
falls short of the extent and type of usage necessary to result in the accrual of a public right] 
Granite County v. Komberec 800 P.2d. 166, 170 (Mont. 1990); S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon 
697 A.2d. 1280,1284 (Maine, 1997); Roberts v. Swim 117 Idaho 9,784 P.2d. 339 (IdahoApp, 
1989) [public's use must be more than casual and desultory for dedication]. 
Utah courts have not clearly ruled one way or the other on such seasonal use. The 
closest ruling occurred in Campbell v. Box Elder County 962 P.2d. 806 (Utah App. 1998) 
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There the landowner opened his gate during the hunting season but closed and locked the 
gate at all other times. This Court held dedication had not occurred since, during ofif-season 
periods, the road was not open for public travel even if the public had a need (which was not 
demonstrated). If seasonal use, alone, is sufficient for dedication, then the seasonal use in 
Campbell would have been sufficient to create dedication - even at the landowner's consent 
which, under Thurman, is irrelevant. In other words, Campbell was correctly decided only 
if it is deemed to rule that seasonal use, alone, is insufficient to establish dedicaiton under 
72-4-105. 
Here, the trial evidence established use of the Road only during hunting seasons. The 
evidence did not establish continuous use or need by the public (excluding adjoining 
landowners under Morris) throughout the remaining months of the year. The trial court's 
refusal to give Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 9 was therefore prejudicial error. 
By failing to give this instruction, the jury was misled into believing that seasonal use, alone, 
was legally sufficient to establish "continuous use throughout the year". This Court' s ruling 
in Campbell (Supra) does not support such an impression. 
V. THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 33 DID NOT ACCURATELY 
STATE UTAH LAW 
Jury Instruction No. 33 advised the jury that they were to determine whether the 
existence of gates "interrupted" the continuity of use of The Road. In other words, the jury 
was led to believe that gates across The Road did not, themselves, have any legal 
significance under Utah law. This was error. Utah appellate courts have not issued any 
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decision requiring that a gate, as necessary to interrupt continuity of use, must be locked or 
be of a specific construction. As in Campbell (Supra), the existence of a gate, locked or 
unlocked, denotes, as a matter of law, that a road is not open for public use. In many 
circumstances, a locked gate is impractical to proper management of remote, agricultural 
land. The presence of a gate is symbolic - announcing that the land or road behind the gate 
is private and not open for public use without the landowner's specific consent. 
The trial court's instruction should have advised the jury that: (1) if they determined 
that a gate, of whatever nature and without regard to locks, was determined to exist across 
The Road; (2) such gate constituted an interruption of the "continuity of use"; and, (3) the 
jury must find a specific 10 year period in which gates were not erected across The Road. 
VI. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING PLAINTIFFS EXHIBITS 4 AND 5 
Evidence of an easement over property, subject to a claim of a public road created by 
abandonment, is fully admissible to establish that use of the road was by the landowner's 
consent. Legal research has not disclosed any Utah decision establishing the specific criteria 
announced by the trial court. Plaintiffs were fully entitled to submit the Gulf Oil and 
Chandler easements to establish that such use was consensual and not adverse to their rights 
as landowners. 
Denial of admission of these easements was clearly prejudicial, since the Court's 
ruling created, in the minds of the jury, that "oil company" usage was hostile, under claim 
of right and without the landowner's consent. Accordingly, by denying admission of these 
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documents, the trial court committed prejudicial, and reversible, error. 
VH. THE JURY VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DEDICATION BY ABANDONMENT 
The standard of proof for "dedication by abandonment" is clear and convincing 
evidence. Morris v. Blunt (Supra) This requires that the evidence "...must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of 
the conclusion based upon the evidence". MUJI 2.19 The jury determined the "continuous, 
consecutive use" period was 1960-1998. However, the evidence of record nowhere supports 
this conclusion. 
1960-70: There were three witnesses called by Uintah County: Gilbert Brough 
claimed to have traveled The Road as a shortcut to reaching Vernal from oil field work areas 
south of the White River. (TR:52,L. 16-22) The road he traveled between 1960 and 1982 
was graded by Uintah County and he observed County graders improving the road. 
(TR:69,L.7-18). Mr. Leonard Heeny claimed to have used The Road only twice in his life. 
(TR:225,L8-17) This was in the mid-60's. (TR:226,L11-13) The road he claims to have 
traveled was "..a bad, bad, bad road....". (TR:226,Ll-4) Mr. Heeny admitted that he was not 
even certain to have actually used The Road at issue. (TR:227,L5-23) Mr. David 
Rasmussen admitted not having been in the area of Wyasket Bottom, or the Plaintiffs' 
properties, for 35-40 years. (TR:230,L16-19) Mr. Rasmussen was not sure whether he used 
The Road, at all, for his Fall hunting purposes. (TR:232,L2-4; 23 l,L18-23) The Road he 
used was rough, with potholes (TR:232;L. 15-16) and impassable if muddy. (TR:231;L. 19-
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20) Mr. Rasmussen went deer hunting in Wyasket Bottom in 1959-1964, which is south of 
Plaintiffs' properties. (TrEx.l) (Appendix D) 
1971-80: There was one witness. Mr. Clay Hacking testified to accompanying his 
father, a Refuge employee, when his father went to the area on Refuge business. 
(TR:240,L.8-18) While his father worked, Mr. Hacking would "play kid stuff9. 
(TR:242,L. 19-21) It was not until Mr. Hacking turned 16, in 1976, and obtained his own 
driver's license that he personally visited the area. (TR:243:L.3-22) Between 1976 and 
1982, Mr. Hacking traveled The Road only during Hunting season (TEL: 245,L9-10) meaning 
Fall of each year. (TR:250,L.4-8) Between 1982 and 1994, Mr. Hacking neither visited the 
area nor used The Road. (TR:251,L.4-6) After 1994, Mr. Hacking used The Road only 
during Hunting season. (TR:251,L. 15-16) Mr. Herb Troester, Refuge Manager 1976-1983 
testified to observing fishermen arriving in Johnson Bottom via routes from BLM lands to 
the east. (TR:210,L.8-13) Notably, however, Mr. Troester simply could not remember 
seeing vehicles travel over Plaintiff's properties to enter or exit Johnson Bottom. 
(TR:210,L. 14-17). 
1981-90: There were two witnesses for this time period: Clay Hacking (1981-82) and 
Mr. Gary Meacham. Mr. Gary Meacham has been the Refuge's heavy equipment operator 
since 1982. (TR:258,Ll-5) During his Refuge duties, he would observe various vehicles in 
Johnson Bottom, Wyasket Bottom and Bull Durham Flats, but only during Hunting season. 
(TR:260,L.2-261,L.5) He observed people onPlaintiffs' properties, but didnothave any idea 
who they were, or their purpose for being there. (TR:261,L. 16-20) Mr. Meacham, a hunter 
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a hunter himself, used The Road to access hunting in I he R efiige (TR :262,L.6-9) and 
occasionally for uls fhlscemu," (TR-262J, 14-17) Between 1995 and 200,1 , however, Mr. 
Ih Imcllrllll lliil ISiglllht'llllf1 UlilH " "HI llllll i I IK /<)J I ,!(! "I). 
1991-98: In addition to Gary Meacham's personal use, observations, there was one 
other witness: Brett Prevedel. Mr Prevedel used the road 1990-98, but only twice each year 
and only during J J C O cuui M c a n t season ( I 1( ,!1 i',l 4 ) Mi l'i Ili I  v\\ 4 S other 
'hit Irs iliiiii mg I )t"i i lliiill iiillni, I  Il in il I 1  l u i i i i j 1 ' h e a s a n l - r a s o i b I I  R . ' I ' M h ( > | I ' l h i c h 
numbers included Refuge vehicles. ( I R:220,L. 17-20) 
Val and Chad Smuin: Beginning in the 1970?s, Val Smuin annually hunted (Fall) and 
trapped coyoi. .;. . - .,..,,.: properties and area^ north w< ^ut i . ,. S r t ce 
proper* -.* H ,! -* •* • < . * **s 
on Plaintiffs' properties to go upon their lane.
 v . i i . i4 t> ,LS - iA7,1^) "Going on the land 
included driving on The Road to perform,,, these activities (Ibid) Mr. Smuin observed 
vehicle - iso'tii >m . I1" fs' pi operties. 
( I R : 149,L. 17-150,L.3) and only during Hunting season. (Ibid) Mr. Smuin openly admitted 
that there are many wa\^ ' _ Johnson Bottom other than going over The R oad. 
I IK I SO,I, M S I J |<M I he mere lucl llial a vehicle is in hihir ill lll  lll  iiiiiii ilnis not ipso 
facto, mean that it has crossed Plaintiffs1 properties I I II1"", III'«III I ?0-?S) Chad Sum i ' 'nTs 
son, traveled The Road alone, afterturning 16in 1988. (IR:189?L 3-22) He relied upon the 
consent given to his fathei by Plaintiffs5 tenants to go upon Plaintiffs' properties. 
- Mil 'I I ilia1 hi1. Ih(tn i I liud Si i in ill in i ihsei'M il iilhi'i idlin It's in (lie diea bill was 
unsure what they were doing there. (TR: 184,L. 13-21). 
On its face, this evidence does not amount to the "clear and convincing" standard 
discussed by this Court in Draper City (Supra). The evidence is most notable for what it 
lacks than what it contains. There is no specificity by any County witness as to the dates 
used: except Deer and Pheasant season. There is no specificity that The Road was used as 
a viable route for travel between commercial points. Instead, The ELoad was used solely to 
ramble around the countryside in search of prey during hunting season. The only consistent 
use, with definitive purpose, was by the Refuge. Yet use by the Refuge, an adjoining 
landowner, is not "use by the public". Morris v. Blunt (Supra). 
The first fallacy in the jury's verdict, therefore, is the presumption - without any 
evidence therefor - that use of The Road was the same outside the hunting season as it was 
during the hunting season. That presumption is unlawful, since The Road, being over private 
property, is presumed to be private unless the converse is established at trial. Morris v. Blunt 
(Supra). The second fallcy in the jury's verdict arises from the continuous time period 
selected by them: 1960-1998. There is only one undisputed fact that pointed the jury to 
adopting the date of "I960": the creation of the Refuge. It appears that the jury presumed 
that Refuge visitors used The Road to tour the Refuge. Yet, there is not a single witness 
testifying to such use - not even the Refuge Managers themselves. The jury was instructed 
that use by the Refuge was not proper evidence to establish "dedication by abandonment". 
Yet, it is clear that the jury did, in fact, use the creation of the Refuge - and the Refuge's use 
of The Road - as the basis for finding dedication. This was clear and reversible error. 
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VHL THE EASEMENT MUST BE LIMITED TO ITS HISTORIC 
USE, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DO SO. 
Highways by prescriptive use are restricted in their width, course and. use to that use, 
913 P.2d. 1247 (Mont 1996); Banger v. Osceola Count) > 45' * - r ? ' > f > ^ : 
IF. Giola, Inc. v. Cardinal American Corp, 23 Ohio App.3d 3 J 401 \ I . 2d 325 ^Jhi-> 
App I {m5) TTiis is the same rule as applied to "easements by prescnpnon"" <r T c nn Behalf 
of '/Mill \\lf I ' W O ) , U f l l ' i i I' II'IN St 
Industries, Inc. v. HaydenLake Watershed Imp. Dist. 112 Idaho 512, 733 P.2d. 733 (Idaho 
1 987); Curran v. fl<we« 753 S.W. 2d. 940 (Mo.App. 1988) 
I Jtah applies such restrictions to' ' 'easements by prescription * XL lindc v McBnde 
681 P.2d. 996, 997 (I Jtah,,. 1,978); I ralvarce i > f 'wral<l9t>\ I" M lii^ ' I 1" I,1! '"1al 1008); 
Kunzler v. O 'Dell 855 l> J!il 270, 275 (I Jtah App ,. The rule is derived from 'the law 
of dominant and servient estates: "the right (under prescriptive easement) cannot be enlarged 
141 p.2d. 696,701 (1943) quoted with approval in Valvarce (Supra ) A court order a Uowing 
more than the historic use during the prescriptive period is conside *e improper. 
/ wi;:/<"" i' i" >7W/ KSS iJ ill! 4< IV " » 
I egal research has not uncovered a Ul.ili IruMui rrjtvliin1, lln ;»nief!il I hut 
4
 "The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and 
limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period". McBride at pg. 997. 
historic use limits the use of a highway created by "prescriptive use" or prohibiting 
application of the prescriptive easement rule to highways by prescriptive use. Since the trial 
evidence did not include use by any vehicle larger than a pickup, then the easement must be 
restricted against use by vehicles larger than 7,500 GVWR. Accordingly, the trial court's 
refusal to so restrict the easement was reversible error. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Plaintiffs request that both the Commonwealth Judgment and the Uintah County 
Judgment be reversed in their entirety and remanded to the Eighth District for trial on all 
claims made by Plaintiffs. 
2002 SIGNED AND SUBMITTED this Pffi" day
 0fCjfr\U^| 
lA^j\>~tWidi>j)L_ 
Mr. James A. Beckwith Mr. Daniel S. Sam 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
# < \I , the undersigned person, do hereby certify that on this day of 
U1/VA 2002,1 deposited two copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' OPENING 
BRIEF WITH ATTACHED APPENDICES with the U.S. Postal Service, first class mail, 
postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Clark B. Allred Mr. Richard A. Rappaport 
McKeachnie, Allred, McClellan & Trotter, P.C. Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
121 W. Main St. 525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
Vernal, UT 84078 A , j Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
(IM/K^ el. h?A(, Jlh^ 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Lauren I. Scholnick (Bar No. 7776) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL. P.C. 
525 East First South. Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City. UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
Attorneys for Commonwealth Land Title 
insurance Company and 
Basin Land Title and Ab-'- • 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
NILE CHAPMAN, ct ai., 
Plaintiffs, 'RDi-.R «)\ < 0*1 *iv>\ w I\AJL i n A.MJ 
I BASIVSMOllO.N FORPARTM 5 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONtio UL 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH, 
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and BASIN' Civil No. 990800255PR 
LAND TITLE AND ABSTRACT, FN* ' . 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Defendants. 
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") and Basin Land Title 
> .t id * bstract. Ii ic.' s ("Basin") Pai tial Mc tion for Summary Judgment having come on for oral 
argument before the Court on the 19th day of December, 2000, the Defendants Com nionw ealth and 
Basin being present and represented by their counsel Richard A. Rappaport and Lauren I. Scholnick 
v i uiisJ. iu i c v : i:i...c, ,A i L; < |_'< i j. /\ )11 \ . x , i. ) c ;.:„* i i , j • i i i < ; i ' i t,ii 111.1 i. i. D 0C11\L\ p!*CSC111 ailLi I""C u)TCSCTilC CI H'*T" InC1 r 
counsel James A. Beckwith and Daniel S, Sam, the Court having reviewed the pleadings and tile. 
having heat d the argument of counsel and for good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
In compliance with Rule 52(a). U.R.Civ.P.. the Court hereby sets forth the grounds for its 
decision to dismiss the Fifth. Sixth. Seventh and Eighth Claims for Relief: 
1. Plaintiffs pi irchased a policy • of title insurance from Commonwealth th rough Basin. 
an agent of Commonwealth's tor the issuance of title policies. 
2. I he title insurance poke} out^; . y.igus: ,...--. i'o. -} . v . - " " - y v . c i ": nc 
Policy"), covered property purchased by Plaintiffs, the closing of which took place in August, 1997. 
3. At the time Plaintiffs hired Basin, they did not provide any written or oral instructions 
IO investigate the roai 1 that ran through the property tl icy inter ided to purchase. 
4. Additionally, they did not provide Basin with any written escrow instructions or 
additional instructions regarding the issuance of a commitment for title insurance or closing on the 
property. 
5. The commitment for title insurance Commonwealth provided, with regard to a road 
that ran: i throi lgh the property states: 
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to 
the following matters, unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of 
the company: 
. . .  18. Property is not located on a coi in! ) road iiid C iraipj my DOES NOT 
INSURE ACCESS. 
6. Sciie^^w ;a. o>xi;* u _ wi u^ -<;,. nsurance policy states: 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will i i 3t 
pay costs, attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: 
. . . I S . Property is not located on a county road and Company DOES NOT 
c ^ 
l i . N O V. • I V l _ 4~\ V_ v_ i _ O -J . 
2 oce 
For the purpose of Summary Judgment. Commonwealth and Basin assume thai there 
is indeed a public road which runs across the Chapmans1 property. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RK! I V.t 
8. Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for relief is a breach of contract claim based upon Schedule 
K ^ecno; i T, paragraph IS, or the Title Commitment and the Fitle Policy (see paragraphs 5 and 6 O . JC^li1 "II 
hereinaoove). 
9. In their F ifth Claim for relief, Plaintiffs claim that the wording of Schedule B. Section ' 
2. paragraph 13. of me Title Commitment and the Title Poiicy rei ;:y tires Defendants to defend 
Plaintiffs against Defendant Uintah County's assertion that the road through Plaintiffs" property is 
a cou.u; 
10. The Court finds that Schedule B, Section 2, paragraph 18 of the Title Commitment 
and i :tiL i'oiicy ^ not ambiguous. I he language clearly states the matters that are to be excluded 
from coverage. 
11. By refusing to defend Plaintiffs against Uintah County's claim that the road is a 
Lounh road. .;:•.. urn •• hi cache I schedule Li, Miction 2, paragraph 18 of the I itle 
Commitment or r!v T:\U' !}olk:> * 
12. 1 neretore. the : um Claim for relief is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
1
 In this case. Commonwealth has acknowledged liability under the policy on the basis that 
m v i w u v-t t v . a i m ( » iv- 'uu v v t u v n V \ . M I J U L L U \ . J d a v. n u LLIIIL'I t i i iu v- w i i i v i i W U J liAji. C A U I U U L U L i u l i i L U V ^ u l L l ' v 
Commonwealth has stipulated that this dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiffs' rights pursuant 
to Section 6(b)(ii) of the Title Policy. 
: 003 
SIXTH AND SEVENTH CLAIMS FOR R EI IEF 
13. The essence of the Plaintiffs' Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action is that Defendants 
Comnionu^nith mid R^sin should be \ jawad |v ik; law a ; abstractor, and. aa SUL'Q. ihe; negligently 
misrepresented the title to the property because of what Plaintiffs allege may be a misstatement of 
the status oi tnc roau in Seueuiiie D. Section 2, I 'aragraph i8. 
i-r. A title insurance policy is no more than a statement of tern is an i condition 5 i ipoi i. 
which the insurer agrees to insure the title of a given property, and does not form the independent 
oasis o L a i o r i ac 11 <. ) 11., 
15. A title insurer is different from an abstractor of title, and a title insurance policy need 
nor explain the history of the land. Gulp Construction Co. v. Bidldmart Mall ~95 P.2d 650 (Utah 
1990). 
16. Schedule B, Section 2, by its clear and unambiguous terms reflects exclusions from 
policy coverage. 
17 Neither Commonwealth nor Basin have a duty to the customer when issuing a title 
insurance policy to list all matters of the public record that will affect title. 
18. Neither Commonwer:'*1- *• :'< - '* •• • *iu: 
issuing a policy for title insurance. 
19. i .•'•" ' . ; .- \. i. .a.; —: -j-iendants are entitled 
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law in that Defendants did not act as abstractors under 
the holding ot C ulp. I he [ itk Commitment and Title Policy reflect contractual terms and are not 
an abstract of tide. 
4 
20. Further, Plaintiffs fail to claim sufficient facts showing that the Defendants foiled to 
make a reasonable search A reasonable sear :1 1 mi ist be defined by i ndusti \ standards and based 
upon what a reasonable title insurance company would do. Section 31A-20-110(l). Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as at r lended, does not impose a duty to abstract titles upon title insurance 
companies. Nor have Plaintiffs submitted any evidence to state what constiti ites a reasonable search 
as defined by industry standards and based upon what a reasonable title insurance company would 
diO. Therefore, Plaintiffs railed to produce ana ; evidence to supper c a fii iding that there was noi a 
reasonable search as required by $3iA-2Q-l 10(1). 
21. For the foregoing reasons, the Sixth Claim .tor Relief for negligent misrepresentation 
and the Seventh Claim for Relief for negligence are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
22. The Eighth Claim lor relief for yu'aijtus liabihh is contingent upon the Fifth, Sixth.. 
and Seventh Causes of Action dismissed herein and therefore, it is dismissed with prejudice. 
i ! MTIVE DAMAGES 
23. The punitive damages claimed fay the Plaintiffs in thei r1! 'arious causes of actioi i are 
also hereby dismissed, with prejudice, since the underlying causes of action have been dismissed. 
'v ' - T"y - ' "'*.' - . . i
 rii:: \ ..in.) : . .••-;*ei arc xrcr>> aismissed with 
prejudice, although Plaintiffs are entitled to bring claims pursuant iu 'wiracrach 6(h .* • h • - *' *'-
Policy and the claims pursuant thereto are not affected by this Order. 
DATED this __ da;/ of :/^."Jl=l£... • ] -
BY THE COURT: 
/^//7^—_ 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
District Conr: r-id-?-* 
5
 o:-o 
( ' \ L R ' b I U L K . . '-M i I 1 LL iNbl .NANl E 
PO[ \('Y NUMBER 2U7-NV9In i 
Issued by Commonwealth Land Tiiie Insurance Company 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
6. OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS: 
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY 
In case of a claim urder ?nU PNU- the Company shall have the 
following ndiN: ••--.'• -Nr^v^ 
.-. : ~ 'uicrv\L,e ^OILK *> itti Parties Other than the 
Insured or W:-': *N Insured Claimant. 
(ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the 
loss or damage provided for under this policy, together with any >. o•-.; 
attorneys fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant which v. <*• ^ 
authorized by the Company up to the time of ravm^nf i r • ---.hi •!• - j ^ 
Company is obligated to pa>. 
Upon the exercise by the (Nmra;.; . . cine; < : the *.,, ^>i, 
•Provided f >r paragraphs ib)«ii ur ( n), the Company N obligation- t 
•he in.-Aii'jd usKic1: this policy U<r the claimed 1 •-.;> or damage, other than 
che payments required io he mad:, i iii terminate, ^eluding an- liability 
C-JO 
' ' \V\'i 'iCi i-Ui.iL i u f IT'LL INSl RAN-
P O I . 1 C Y N T . T M B F R 2 0 7 - N ^ 1 ^ 
Issued A-vr^nv ^Af ! rA L- insii:' ince L-mpany 
SCKEDUi.L B 
This policv does not insure against loss or damage (and the 
Company will not pay costs, attorneys fees or expenses) which arise tr 
reason of: 
18. Proper1/, is :i »t k,v:'in\ 
f \ s | k M \( < I . -
> i 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8084 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, Uintah County 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-4908 
MARK THOMAS 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 E 100 N 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 781-4356 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE .'.)[•' UTAH 
NILE CHAPMAN, ROGLn uHAPMAN ) 
and GORDON HARMSTON, TRUSTEE ) 
OF THE EUGENE HARMSTON TRUST, ) 
) ORDER AND 
Plaintiffs, ) JUDGMENT 
vs . ) 
UINTAH COUNTY, ) Civil No. 990800255 
) Judge: A. Lynn Payne 
Def endciii t. . ) 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for a jury 
trii". en September 4 and ! ' . The parties having presented 
.. - . •- and argued •• .. ;ter to the jury and the jury 
having been instructed and having entered its verdict finding that 
the road was a j ., . , from 1960 through 1998 and 
based on that verdict, the Court orders as follows: 
oc-s 
1. The road identified as the North Wyasket Bottom Road as 
it crosses the real properties owned by the Plaintiffs in Section 
33, Township 7 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian and Section 
4, Township 8 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian is a public 
road pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §72-5-104. 
2. The Plaintiffs are enjoined from interfering with the 
public's use of the road as it crosses their real property. 
3. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the width of 
the road where it crosses the Plaintiffs' properties shall be 
twelve feet and shall follow its historic course except as set 
forth on the attached map. 
DATED this J< J day of September, 2001. 
A. Lynn P^ ryne 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
James A. Beckwith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
t : \ U i n t a h County-Chapman\order and judgment 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COTiNTY STATF OF ITT\H 
NILE CHAPMAN, ROGER CHAPMAN, : RULING 
and GORDON HARMSTON, TRUSTEE 




UINTAH COUNTY, : Case No.: 990800255 
Defendant. : 
The Court has reviewed the proposed orders which have been submitted by the parties. 
The issue at trial was whether the road was a public road. The jury was not asked to decide 
and did not decide whetlier there was any limit on the type of vehicle which could use the 
road. Therefore, the Court has signed the Order submitted by Defendants. 
DATED this I 0 day of September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
M^ 
A. LYNN PAYNE\ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the^J Vk. day of September, 2001, true and correct copies of 
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. James A. Beckwith, 
Attorney at Law, at 7910 Ralston Road, Suite 7, Arvada, CO 80002, Mr. Daniel S. Sam, 
Attorney at Law, at: 319 W. 100 S., Vernal, UT 84078, Mr. Clark A. Allred, Attorney at 
Law, at 121 W. Main Street, Vernal, UT 84078, and to Mr. G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah 
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Permissive use of a road cannot result in either adverse possession or dedication of a road to 
1 he public use as a public highway. If you find that the owner of the land on which the road at issue 
is located did not object to the public's use of the road, then you shall iind that thtj mad ^n^ nnt 
dedicated to public use. 
SOURCE: Campbell v. Box Elder County 906 P.2d. 806, 807 (Utah App. 1998) 
Disk: inst 4.chp 
01 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining whether a road has been dedicated and abandoned to public use, the Defendant 
Uintah County must prove each nf die follow mi' elements by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. Use by the public; 
2. For ten consecutive years or more; 
3. Without the consent of the landowner; and, 
4. As a public thoroughfare. 
If the Defendant I Jintah Coi 111.1:3 has not proven each of these four elements by clear and 
convincing evidence, then you shall render a verdict declaring that the road at issue in this proceeding 
has not been dedicated and abandoned to public use. 




A "thoroughfare" is a place or way through which there is passing or travel. It becomes a 
"public thoroughfare" when the public has a general right of passage. Under our governing statute 
(72-5-104), the road, even though it be over privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or 
abandoned to the public use when 1 fit'pubdi ha , i'ontinuousl\ used il a> a f hoi oughfare for a period 
often (10) years, but such use must be the public. Use under private right is not sufficient If the 
thof oughfare is laid out or used as a private way, its use, however long, as a private way does not 
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the public also makes i ise of it without objectioi i. fi om 
the owner of the land, will not make it a public way. 
SOURCE: Heber City Corp. v. Simpson 942 P.2d. 307, 311 (Utah, 1997) 
Mom\ i Ilium IM P I LV, Mil (Utah, 1916) 
Disk: inst6xhp 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Seasonal use of a road by hunters or fishermen does not constitute public use of the road as 
thoroughfare when the landowner has not barred or prohibited use of the road during hunting and 
fishing seasons. The landowner may consent to such seasonal use without dedicating the road to 
public use. 
SOURCE: Campbell v. Box Elder County 962 P.2d. 806, 807 (Utah, 1998) 
Disk: inst8.chp 
016 
INSTRUCTION NO.: 3 3 
There has been testimony concerning certain gates across the roadway at various times. 
Such gates may or may not interrupt the public use of the roadway. Whether the gates which 




KNOW ALL MtIN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
n . Violfi I , Ha.nnr.ton and Enrold Predriclrhon' 
herein called "Gtantor", whether one or more, for and in consideration of the sum of__^^21_^£i---L?X?-Jl?.<r 
0 . th6r ._OOECidorc ; t i 03 £WS* (•? 1 0 * Q ° ) in hand paid, receipt of whirfi 
hereby ccUowlcdgcd, does hereby grant and convey unto J ^ ^ ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ J S : ? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
herein called '"Grantee", its successors and assign*, an eascm-nt and right of way over the land hereinafter described for ti 
rig.hr to Uy. construct, maintain, repair, operate, replace, change the size of, and remove a pipe line for the convejanre 
transportation of cr^xdc oil nnd its produces, gas, water, or any combination thereof interchangeably, upon such route a* in 
be selected by Gran:ce through, over or across the following described land situated in the County of 
Stntc cf U t e h to-wit: 
\ A 30 ' r ight-of-v&y (15 ' perpondicuiar on e i t h e r s ide of the fol lowing desor ibed c e n t e r l i 1 
—J3eglaaing-^Lt-n point-on-tho. north l\m of.^ect±onJ5\^3S^ZlE^+l~&^-*^^^20QZ»2Lj 
t h e north i corner of sa id sec t ion ; Thence S 5° 41 f 05" E 3 3 6 . 7 ' ; Thence S 2 18f 45" E ( 
—gfeer>co~S^2^£-4.4.,-~5Q11 TV 22f cor-o-oxi-l^&s-to a poin t on the-soo th liTiq nf .T,at^5-of finid Sa, 
Containing 0.93 ac res more or l e s s . 
—yoto^-~&r-&ntoo agreoi; to—g-y&des—eU=a-in—aad ipaintain~a—rog.d- parall-o-1 t o the-pJLpeULnc—Q£~a— 
q u a l i t y equal t o G u l f ' s ex i s t i ng l e a s e r o a d s . 
&r£r to r -^Hi l4 -4 rc^e - th^ 
or r e h i c l e n . 
T o Have and To Hold the said right of way unto the Grantee, its successors and assigns so long as same shall be uscfi 
for ?ny purporc* d-.sired by said Grantee, its successors and assigns, subject to the terms nnd conditions hereinafter sei fort 
Additional Lines. The Grantee shall have the right, and the same is hereby granted to such Grantee, to lay, construe 
maintam, operate, replace, change the size of, and remove such additional lines across said land adjacent to and parallel s\t' 
the first pipe line as may be desired by Grantee. When and it such additional lines are laid, the Grantee shall pay to tr 
Grantor as consideration for the right of way for each such additional pipe line the same consideration set forth above pn 
rated ;»: the proportion that the number of rods or fraction thereof of said additional line bears to the total number of roc 
of the line hereinabove authorized. 
Right of Ingress and Egress. For the same consideration set forth above, Grantee, its successors and assign*, shall ha\ 
the right to do whatever may be requisite for the enjoyment of the rights herein granted, including the right of clearing sai 
right of way of timber and of ingress, egress and regress to and from the above described land for any purpose incident i 
the rights herein granted. 
Burial of Pip.: Line. Grantee agrees that any pipe line or pipe lines authorized hereby shall be buried a sulficicnt dcp» 
so as not to interfere with the normal cultivation of any part of the land covered by said right of way which can otherwise I 
cultivated without interference with the rights herein granted. 
Surface Uses . The Grantee shall have the right, and the same is hereby granted to such Grantor, to con>truct, inai 
tain, replace and remove scraper boxes for u>e in connection with the operation of at\y pipe hue referred to above, meters as 
meter setting*, drip.s and pits for use therewith, as may be desired by Grantee. 
Removal of Pipe Lines and nquipment. Any and all pipe lines, structures and equipment placed upon or buried in t. 
above described land pursuant to the right* heicin granted shall remain the property of Grantee and may b.* r f t v v c d » 
Grantee ;:? ;»ny time during or after the term of this grant. 
Pa)inent for Damages. Grantee shall pay Grantor for a!! damages to growing crops nnd trrcs on the above dcscrib* 
land resulting from the m-c ol the rights heirin granted. 
Waiver of McMir'tcad, Dowrr and Courtesy. Grantor hereby releases nnc\ wiivcs all rights of dowei. courtesy .uu\ hom 
stead under the laws of the state where the above described land is located, and th»s agreement shall be binding upon t 
undcrsicned. their he»rs. devisees, executor*, administrators,, successors and ./assigns. 
,~ ri ,/#% - y /, ,. 
W I T N E S S the signature, of Grantor >h,. / 3 - ff/^'//^",Uy of '?*/>''&'&££ 1 ° -^~ 
"J Stale ol Utah ) 
Courry oHJinlsh ) 
I, Randy Simmons. County Flecordcr in *nd lor Ulr an 
Coun y. Sla(« of Utah do r"v»!>y cc-rii'y tli&t the nbove in I 
lorrpoipfl Is o lull, |ruo ;»mf correal c7V»V cf ihoonfjlnal 
whib^i ti ol rcM^rchfi LM .[ ) , i "o* l'\ /- tW> ' 
ttl Y,:rKi-.Si*. WliLrT'.' . ' . . •' - . i rt/l".mi and *u«l f \ 1 Cl 
u.i. rA \{±L <v _lc'/ij!jCvTLL -JilLLil U - r O -
J - ^ j f t ^ - ^ U . J ^ l U i £ / j L ^ ' ' e c o r t i o r 
/ GRAN I OK 
STATU OP.. L T i ,2 i \ 
COUNTY •-. OF , D ^ C h e S n e 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - INDIVIDUAL 
ss. All Scares (except Kentucky) 
GO.?, 
On thi;;... J..3.th.da7 of._J?ep.t^b.5£.. 
?.-VTJ .-«d..;.: ..YA?.l£..X:i&J^sJ:pn 
I9—-/3. . . before roe, a Notary Public in and for said Counry and State, p^rsoniliy 
— and 
to r.cJcnoVn to be the.'identical person described in and who executed the within nnd foregoing inscrumeot and acknowledged to me that 
-•-"-- •:— >,J^*}^d the «irae as .*}.?£ free nnd voluntary act and deedJar the uses and purposes therein set forth. 
• .Wir.vrs^yr.y^r*.^. and official seal the day and year above written. ^Ac^u^%~-*~-- T i ^ C £ . - - Z ^ v 
iiSt^H^;!. ^™J±1.}?]1 "'"Relldi7g'a"t ^oaevel^ ' l fUh * o T ^ T u ' * 
'^'••••'.'....;.^-V ' ACKNOWLEDGMENT - INDIVIDUAL 
'Mfr ; rc^vB:H _. _. . - .1 
couN7T. :6rl^*es.n5_ j s s A" S u t" (tmt'' Kcnmckl,) 
.OS_ this J.UZ^ ..day of. § .6p.ueHlb3r. _ , I 9 ' 3 , before me. a Notary Public in and for said County and State. pctsoc.iUy 
a^ fcv*i) d M ^ J k l Z r e ^ c k s o n
 aad _ 
.*rc//no kno?/r».tq b*;:he Identical person described in aad who executed the wichtn and foregoing instrument and acknotv 
'f'....\v\S-Qy..j~'.cr.ezu:rzl'<hc same as *}iV.?. free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forr! 
-.5 W(TNE5Svrny rficJ ind officixl seal rhe day and year above wrirren. /JJ^JU^. _^S s&L*~r~--~^i£l-' 
K\- rofcmissicq.t^ucs^ 
owUJged to nie that 
h. 
Residing at Roosevelt,Utah 
Notary Public 
ACKNOWLEDGAAENT - CORPORATION 
STATE* OF» vj 
COUNTY OF— 
-1 J " Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico. Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming 
On this day of , 19 , before me appeared 
to me persoriHlly known, who, being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the — of_.... 
and that the seal affixed to the foregoing instrument is the corporate seal of said corporation 
and that said instrument was signed and sealed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its Board of Directors, and said...-
acknowledged said instrument to be th; free act and deed of said corporation. 
WITNESS my band and official seal the day and year above written. 
Notarr Public 












ACKNOWLEDGMENT - CORPORATION 
STATE OF .; ) Colorado. Idaho. Illinois. Kansas, 
\ SS. Mnnrmi. Nebraska, Notch Dakota, 
COUNTY OF j Ohio. Oklahoma. South Dakota 
O.i »hi-, chy of . IV , Lrfuie "me, a Nut.ny'l\iMi.. in mi-l Id r- •»•! < mmiy MV\ St i«—* * f rn"» <Nv 
appeared
 t l o me known tn be the 
of , a corporation, and to be the identical person who subscribed the nsm? of said corporation 
v.i the lort? f^>«n^ inr.'.tumer.t o» its and acknowledged to me that be executed the same as his free atnl voluntary at't and 
V.'l IMl-S'.i r.»> Innd nnd official seal the d ty and year above written. 
KiliH! O r WAY 
KNOW' ALL M E N BY T H E S E PRESENTS? 
T J Earold. Fredricknon 
, . ,, , ..r- „ , , f t - -J r .1 r Ten d o l l a r s and 
herein c-Jled Grantor
 f whether one or more, For and in consideration of the sum ol 
_C_ the r C O n s i d o r a t i o n .Dol lars (? 1 Q ' 0 Q ) h\ hand paid, receipt of which is 
. . t t j j J i . . gesmayAngfcTgetoaateaac Gulf Oi l Corp . 
Kerrey acknowledged, docs hereby grant nnd convey unto £zZ^ZZ~: S—.—-7irt=iz?l y.^±± :r. c • , 
herein called "Grantee" , its successors and assigns, an casement and r ight of way nvcr the land hereinafter described for the 
r igh: to lay, construcr, maintain, repair , operate , replace, change the size of, and remove a pipe line for the conveyance or 
transportation of crude oil and its products , gas, water, or any combination thereof interchangeably, u p o n such route, as may 
be selected by Grantee through, over or across the following described land situated in the County of l , 
Stare of Stab tO'Wit: 
.A ZO* richfc-of-'vrty (15 ! pe rpend icu la r on e i t h e r s i d e of tho fo l lomins desc r ibed Ceccer l ino) 
R~4nni-E£-at~&-|*3igfc-^»-*hg-^c s t ll^e^C-S^ctlon^ZZ^JTIS^-i2lEr--S^^B^^U-J3rjr±h-..,S58 .S l_£ros . 
t he irest £ c o m e r of caid s e c t i o n ; Thence K 29* 46* 40" E 48 .9*; Thonce N 37* 24' S0« E 713,0* 
Containing 0*82 acres more o r l e s s . 
qua l i t y equal t o G u l f ' s e x i s t i n g lea6e roads . 
6 r ^ c n ~ - f t e : H r ^ a T ^ M ; h e - - r ^ 
or - reh ic les . 
T o Have and T o Hold the said r ight of way unto the Grantee , its successors and assigns so long as same shall be useful 
for any purposes desired by said Grantee, its successors and assigns, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
Additional Lines. The Grantee shall have the right, and the same is hereby granted to such Gran tee , to lay, construct, 
maintain, opctate, replace, change the size of, and remove such addit ional lines across said land adjacent to and parallel with 
the first pipe line as may be desired by Grantee . When and i( such addi t ional lines are laid, the Gran tee shall pay to the 
Grantor as consideration for the right of way for each such addit ional pipe line the same consideration set forth above pro-
rated in the proportion that the number of reds or fraction thereof of said additional line bear* to the total number of rods 
of the lir.e hereinabove authorized. 
Right of Ingress and Ogress. For the same consideration set forth above, Grantee, its successors and assigns, shall have 
the right to do whatever may be requisite for the enjoyment of the r ights herein granted, including the right of clearing said 
right of way of timber and of ingress, egress and regress to and from the above described land for any purpose incident to 
the rights herein granted. 
Burial of Pipa Line. Grantee agrees that any pipe line or pipe lines authorized hereby shall be buried a sufficient depth 
so as not to interfere with the normal cultivation of any part of the land covered by said right of way which can otherwise be 
cultivated without interference with the rights herein granred. 
Surface Uses. T h e Grantee shall have the right, and the same is hereby granted to such Grantee , to construct, main-
tain, replace and remove scraper boxes for u.:e in connection with the operat ion of any pipe lino referred to above, meters and 
meter setting?, drips and pits, for use therewith, as may be desired by Grantee . 
Removal of Pipe Lines and Hquipmcnt. Any and all pipe lines, structures and equipment placed upon or buried in the 
above described land pursuant to the rights herein granted shall remain the property of Grantee and may br removed by 
Ornn;»e .-.: any tunc during or after the term ol this grant . 
Payment for Damages. Grantee shall pay Grantor for all damages to growing crops and trees on th* above d-srr ibrd 
land resulting from the use of the rights herein granred. 
Waiver of Homcf.tcnd, Dower -and Courtesy. Grantor hereby releases and waives ail rights of dower, courtesy and home-
stead under the laws of rlir Mr.tc where the above: described land is located, and chis agreement shall be binding upon the 
undersigned, then heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, successors and assigns. 
/ ^/ 
W I T N E S S the signatures of Grantor this / ^ _ * ^ d\ny c f ^.tCJ^'j^C^l^^F.Cl.fZ'. !9_Hi 
o ^ ~—"— 
£20 
STATK OF.. Utah 
cotINTY OF di^.he.nyeL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - INDIVIDUAL 
AH States (except Kenrucky) 
G05 
i ss. 
On• A i s . . l l ; t h . . . . d j 7 o f . . . . S e j O t a m b e r t 19.-7 .3 , before me, a Notary Public in and for said Coun-7 and State, personally 
nrp«>VJ* ! . : A ^ ^ . 1 ? L J ^ ^ . ^ ^ J ^ ^ t ^ . 1 ^ _ . and _ _ . 
*°. rcrv»".;vVvn tD-be th<? identical person described in and who executed the within aad foregoing iascniment and acknowledged to me rhat 
h i s 
....cy.;..'..^*-.. . . . — . c r e c ^ i the same as f.^ rf.f?. free and voluntary* act and.deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. 
'**•. ^XTOit-oS my h.uidj.?njd official seal the day and year above written. L~~zC 
\ i *. 
•/.eo»niii«X-iwV^ViS?-.23*J[9V5__ Residing a t Roosevel t ,Utah. Nonpublic 
. - ; : # -
STATfc O F : v : - ^ $ - : . . . 
COUNTY Q?/ . 'A-
On this day of 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - INDIVIDUAL 
I SS. All States (except Kenrucky) 
19 , before me, a Nor»ry Public in and for said County aad Stare, personally 
and , 
to nvs known to be the identical person described in and who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that 
executed die same as free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forrh. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year above written. 
My commi:sion expires . 
Motaty Public 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - CORPORATION 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF.. 
SS. Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming 
On this.- .. day of.. 1° , before me appeared 
to me personally known, who, beiug by me duly sworn, did say that he is the.. of . 
, and char the seal affixed to the foretjoinij instrument is the corporate seal of said corporation 
and that said instrument was signed and sealed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its Doard of Directors, and said 
....acknowledged said iastniment to be the free act and deed of said corporation. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year above written. 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT - CORPORATION 
STATU OP . ) Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
} SS. Mn.tr wn Nebraska. North lbkni.-i. 
CCH l is ' IV U l J M|,j..( (.it|..l, ., ;,..,•!, If,!,..., 
On thh djy of. , 19 , before me, a Notary.Public in and for said County and State*, personally 
appeared .=• , to me known to be the 
P-r - - , a corporation, and to lv: (iv; iuer.ric.il person Y.'.-.O snVsctiS-d (he nnnir of said corporator, 
"» rVr U'Try*'<T. i " < " " " V T ••'» J'« ?r,r\
 a f 4 ~r"<-l>v';;cd tn p*- rf.rir hr f y / - p i v , l f V .sir,,- ;,« ),,< (r~t ?n.\ VC,J.. #.»;;» •_<:: - » J 
t i e d ;ti;u a; (h.*: Jtoj.* a»:d vriluntary act a«nl deed of such corporation ft.t the uses ;»iul purposes th-rein 5cc forth. 
VITKl iSS mv hind and official >cal the d.'y and vc.u ahovr written. 
RIGHT 6r- WAY 
KKOW ALL MHN BY THESE PRESENTS: g<[\' 
KoTtrd L« Earraston Th; 
herein e: lied "Gran to r " , whether one or more, for and in consideration of the sum of if:]l-9.0*-~IirC ^ 
_.O.th0r . . .C.cnsJLderr , . t . i0 i l Dollars ( # _ 1 2 - L 2 2 ) in Ii.imi paid, receipt of v.-hirh is 
. , . , , , , , , j gyggryimyaigrrfflg Guif OH Corp. 
hereby acknowledged, does hereby grant, and convey unto. herein called "Grantee.*', its successors and assigns, an casement and right of way over the Innd hereinafter described Icz rhe 
right to lay, construct, maintain, repair , operate, replace, change the sire of, and remove a pipe line for the conveyance or 
transportat ion of crude oil a n d its products , gas, water, or any combination thereof interchangeably, upon such route as may 
be selected by Orantec th rough , over o r across the following described land situated in the County of u , 
Sratc of EfcfitL. 
A 30» right-of-Tray (15* perpendicular on e i ther side of the following described center l ino) 
Containing 1*11 acres jnoro or l e s s * 
-Hate:—Grantee agreets-te- grftdey-^rtfete-ftgd-»aintfti^v-e;--fo^d~^ral4^1~to--4he~>pipel-ine-of-a 
qual i ty equal t o GulffB ex is t ing lease roadc. 
Qitmlvi Uiari—h-gve the right to croee B&i-d>^ipe^jae-^^ht^£,-^&>'-^i^-Jw&ter-4-iner, 
or v e h i c l e s . 
T o H a v e and T o H o l d the said r ight of way unto the Gran tee , its successors and assigns so long as same shall be useful 
for any purposes desired by said Grantee , its successors and assigns, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
Addit ional Lines. T h e Grantee shall have the right, and the same is hereby granted to such Grantee, to lay, construct, 
maintain, opera te , replace, change the size of, and remove such additional lines across said Innd adjacent to and parallel with 
the first p:pc line as may be desired by Grantee. When and i( such additional lines arc laid, the Grantee shall pay m the 
Grantor as consideration for the r ight of way for each such addit ional pipe line the same consideration set forth above pro-
rated in the proport ion that the number of rc-Js or fraction thereof of said additional line beari to the total number of rods 
of the line hereinabove author ized. 
Right of Ingress and Egress. For the same consideration set forth above, Grantee, its successors and assigns, shall have 
the right to do whatever may be rrquisicc for the enjoyment of the rights herein granted, including the right of clearing said 
right of way of timber and of ingress, egress and regress to a n d from rhe above described land for any purpose incident to 
the r ights herein granted. 
Bunp.l of Pipe Line. Grantee agrees that .iny pipe line o r pipe lines authorized hereby shall be buried a sufficienr depth 
so as not to interfere with the normal cultivation of any part of the land covered by said right of way which can otherwise be 
culuVateci witnotrt interference with the rights herein granted. 
^ Surface Uses . T h e Grantee shall have the right, and t h e same is hereby granted to such Grantee , to construct, main-
tain, replace and remove scraper boxes for use in connection with the operation of any pipe line referred to above, meters and 
meter sett:r.g«. dr ips and pits for use therewith, as may be desired by Grantee. 
Removal of Pipe Lines and Equipment . Any and all p ipe lines, structures and equipment placed upon or buried in the 
above described land pursuant to rhe rights herein granted shall remain the property of Grantee and may b.« removed bv 
Grantee n any tunc dur ing or afrcr rhe term o\ this grant. 
Payment for Damages. Grantee shall pay Grantor for all damages to growinr o o p s and trees on th t .-.hove described 
land resulting from the u5c of the rights herein granted. 
VC'n.vcr of Homcftcad, Dower and Courtesy. Grantor hereby releases and wnivrs all rights of dower, courtesy .uul homr-
ztc-td under the laws of the Mate where the above described land is located, ^d this atjre'emem shall he bindinc upon ,1V 
undersigned, their heirs, devisees, executor*, administrators, successors ^d assigns. " 
— " ~ '
r
' ' * -
 /
 • 
W I T N E S S the signatures of Grantor th i ; . / / '" ..._.4-.v of ,Vr* «? ^ V v V ^ - y y ! 9 ..:'l-2 
S'XV 
-c,-:^- ••;>>.*-. >.-6o 'Mr-*^^£J^4^^^^:^:. 
022 
STATE OF Jiteh.. 
COUNTY or.R!f.5£!9.§BSL. 
^^rvi^^yYLCU^MENT — INDIVIDUAL 
ss. 
60"? 
All States (except Kentucky) 
rk„ ,uw 1 7 t h , •"-".• September
 n~ 
Km ini3. . ; day or *. _ , I 9 . . . I J .. before me, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, jvrrsorul 
f.ppenrcd l i L H i T ^ M ^ l I f e ^ J . ^ n and _ — 
• \ . «!/,' ' • , n V- * "* * 
to rne %>;**W to be t h ^ d e n e i o l person described in and who execut-d the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
 t o me th 
"*."*.'"'v *""• .fx^^tetjtthe ^same as—Brk??... frfi€ atuf voluntary act and.deed for the uses and purposes therein set forrh. 
': :-*^,n>.,ESS%rtvj':iund intgo^ficial seal the day and year above written. / \ X / J ^ ^ ^ ~ 
N.V t^mx%l^^Z/j^k^JZi^J32B Residing at Roosevelt, Utah Sofar7 ruh,ic 
STATE OF.... -•J,a;iSvC 
COUNTY OK .l.M_.._ 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - INDIVIDUAL 
ss. 
On this day of 
nppc-sred 
All States (except Kentucky) 
19 , before me, a Notary Fublic in and for said County and State, personail 
to me known to be the identical person described in and who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me tha 
- executed the same as free and voluntary act and deed foe the uses and purposes therein set forth. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year above written. 
My commission exotcts.. 
Notary Public 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT - CORPORATION 
STATE O f 
COUNTY OF J ss. 
Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming 
On this day of , 19— , before me appeared 
to me personally known, who, being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the ..of.. 
, and that the seal affixed to the foregoing instrument is the cotporate seal of said corporation 
and that said instrument was signed and sealed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its Board of Directors, and said . 
acknowledged said instrument to be the free act and deed of said corporation, 
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year above written. 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT - CORPORATION 
STATE 01" 1 Colorado. Idaho, Illinois. Kansas. 
I SS. Montana. Nebraska. North Dakota. 
COUNTY 0l : J Ohio, Oklahoma, South DA'o:a 
U11 ilm »|i) of
 # 10 |i.-f..i. i».»\ * fft.fii, I'ul'lir in an.! f»f Mil Omrtry and Rtatf, jn't\ »tull 
appeared :
 ( (o mc known to be th- -
°- - , a corporation, ant! 1? IK the idrnticat person who subscribed IIK rutnc of saiil corpor.it- • 
to the- forc.U'vn;; instf:rncnJ .xs its
 3 n d nt.knov-'ted;».cd ta r.:e tlu: \r, executed thr sjrnr ns IJI\ fn-e an«l voluntary .v.t T , 
deed aiv.; r.. ibr iree and voluntary act. and ttceil of sv.ch corporation for the us.-s and purposes therein set forth 
VC'I I r.'nNf. n\y Ji.m.l niirl official seal the d.iy n; 1 ^ e.ir above written. 
O r * ' " " i NotVry" l'ub!,\ 
Mi- co«r.nt:r.;»«i'i '.-.tniris v/ +* \J 
County of Uintah ) 
I, Randy Simmons, County Reeordtr In and fur Ulr,a^, 
County, State of Utah do hereby certify that the «bovt irvi E.MTFY 97000053 
lorecoing is a lu l l , true and correct copy of the onf l lnat^ BOOK 62d r r ^ G E I o 1 - . 
^ ^ U r - o r »wA-f « - f A \ f M ; v i Entry No. ^ l o o o o S ^ 
ax I _ * _ L . y no . _ u . R I G H T - O F - W A Y A N D E A S E M E N T FOR R O A D W A Y , 
which I . o l « e o r d in ih .5 orj.ee In 0 o o k J f 3 L - P « f l « ^ L 5 - ^ t POWER LINES A N D PIPELINES £ N T P . Y 9 7 0 0 0 0 5 S 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto aet my hand and Mai t00K. 633 PAGE 3 1 5 - 3 l b * 16 ,00 
ih«5_2J^ °> ffi*" " \ ^ ^ R A N D Y S I M M O N S 
Uafr.Mfrrawi .Rocordor RECORDER.' UINTAH C0UMTY* UTAH 
- * * 
L ^ y C l f e ^ D^pgry CHANDLER AH0 ASSOCIATES INC 
* ^ KNOW A L L M L N UV THESE PRESENTS: 475 17TH ST *1000 DENVER CO 30202 
Rec B Y : SYLENE ACCUTT0R00P > DEPUT' 
That the undersigned, whether one or more, hereinafter referred to as Grantor, for and in consideration of the 
sum of TEN D O L L A R S (S 10.00) and other valuable considerations, the receipt and suff iciency o f which is hereby 
acknowledged, does hereby gran:, sell and convey unto Chandler &. Associates, Inc., 475 !7 ih Street, Suite 1000, 
Denver, CO 80202, hereinafter referred to as Grantee, its successors and assigns, a right-of-way and casement to locate, 
survey and construct, entrench, maintain, operate, protect and abandon a road, power line or power lines, and a pipeline 
or pipelines w i th appurtenances thereto, including, but not l imited to, valves, metering equipment, and cathodic 
equipment (said road, power line or power lines and pipelines, appurtenances, valves, metering equipment, cathodic 
equipment being sometimes collectively called the " faci l i t ies") over, under and through the hereinafter described land 
on a right-of-way thirty (30) fee: in w id th . It is understood that this r ight-of-way and casement does not constitute a 
conveyance in fee o f any part o f the premises hereinafter described. 
This r ight-of-way and easement shall carry wi th it the right o f ingress and egress to and from, and access on 
and along said r ight-of-way, wi th the right to use existing roads which enter Grantor's property for the purpose o f 
constructing, inspecting, repairing and maintaining the facilities and the removal or replacement of same at w i l l , either 
in whole or in part, and the replacement o f said pipeline or pipelines wi th cither like or different size pipe. During 
temporary periods Grantee may use such portions o f the property along and adjacent to said r ight-of-way as may be 
necessary in connection wi th construction, maintenance, repair, removal or replacement o f the facilities and i f such use 
causes any damruvv to ^ " J i n ^ r ' s lands onf* ! J? of the ab'«"r 'ic-crlHcd r ight-of-way, Grnntce c l , * , l r v i n b " - r * G» mtor 
for such damages. 
TO H A V E A N D T O H O L D the above described rights and easements together wi th all rights necessary to 
operate and maintain the facilities over the right-of-way hereby granted unto the said Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
the Grantee may assign the rigSis herein gnn»-d e : ,hrr i r wh«i? or in n » i . $object to the terms o f this prant. and such 
rights and easements shall be covenants running wi th the land and be binding upon Grantor, their heirs, legal 
teprcscntatives and successors in t i t le. 
Grantee may at any time execute and record, and upon permanent abandonment o f said right-of-way, shall 
execute and record a reconveyance and release hereof, whereon this r ight-of-way and easement and all rights and 
privileges herein granted shall be canceled and terminated. Grantor reserves the right to the use and enjoyment o f said 
property except for the purposes herein granted, but such use shall not hinder, confl ict or interfere wi th Grantee's surface 
or subsurface rights hereunder or disturb its facilities. No road, reservoir, excavation, obstruction or structure shall be 
constructed, created or maintained on, over, along or wi th in the lands covered by this r ight-of-way without Grantee's 
prior written consent. 
In addition to the consideration for the right-of-way and easement provided for herein. Grantor acknowledges 
the receipt and suff iciency o f additional ronsidcraf ;on for nil dnmar^s to Grantor's frees, timber and growing crops 
caused by the construction, maintenance, protection, repair, placement or removal o f the facilit ies. 
Grantee agree; to maintain said ' . iscmen: ar.H r'ght-nf-wny r o v l w a y in accordance wi th general oil f ield 
standards and pra i r ie . . " " . t ; ' . * \ y . i n * ' . ' \ i h , for '• v * •»- '.r.aic : ; useful lo Gr;»n«r* - »v:d<^ h ( . \ v » r \ : . »'ir i"a » 
any act o f nature such as, but not l imited lo, landslide, f lood, snowslidc or washout, damages or destroys any portion 
o f said road, Grantee shall not be required to repair or replace same or in any manner be responsible therefor. Provided 
further that in the event any governmental agency, whether Federal, State or County, acquires any portion or portions 
o f said right-of-way by condemnation or otherwise, Grantee shall not be required to upgrade, maintain or relocate any 
such portion or portions o f said r ight-of-way so acquired. 
For the snrnc consideration rcr::«*d above, Grr.r.trc does hrrchv rclcr.sr, discharge and ncnr.it Grr.r.tnr, i',5 
employees, agents, contractors, successors and assigns from any and all l iabi l i ty , and shall indemnify Grantor against 
any and all claim', and demands for damage;, injury- or Ions, existing now fir don- hereafter, to the surface of said lands 
or to any third parties arising out o l or being the result o l Grantee's activities or use of the premise:. However, 
Grantee's potential l iabi l i ty unc ; r this paragraph shall be l imited to its own nets and shall not include any acts and'or 
omissions of Grantor or ir« predecessor5; Likewise. Grpn tor hereby nrn-rs to indemnify, defend, ami hold Gnnlce 
harmless against any and nil cL ; ms against Grantor. 
Grantor represents a;* J warrants that Grantor is the owner in fee simple of the land hereinafter described, 
subject only to outstanding mortgages, i f an), now o f record in said county, and in the event o f default by Grantor. 
Grantee shall have the right, tu t not the obligation, lo discharge or redeem for Grantor, in whole or in part, any 
mo i i ra j i c t . i \ oi oil ier lien on r.iid hind ;md li ierciipon be submi t ted In.such Itu» and iiv.hr. incident Iheielo 
)r t)v: rvenf Grnnlce r.:erls additional dirt/clay for genera! maintenance of w h a t e v e r in kind Grantor uiU sell 
to Grantee b.'i.i uirt Tor i»i).Mi j ;.* yard 
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The land covered hereby is located tn Uintah County, Utah, and is more particularly described as follows 
/ W fl.Vf-i Township 7 Smith. Ranee 21 T?st. S I. TV&M 
Section 33 S/2NC. NWSC. E/2SW 
p^j IfianaliipJL^nitiK nangc 21 (, .w, s ULLM 
7 - / J - / Section 4 N^NE. SENE 
Containing approximately 673 rods more or less 
This Right-of-Way and Easement for Roadway, Power lines and Pipelines Agreement may be executed in any 
number of counterparts and shall be binding upon all parties executing the same or a counterpart hereof 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THIS RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENT FOR ROADWAY. POWER LINES, 
AND PIPELINES is executed by the parties hereto as of the date of their respective acknowledgments, but is effective 




 / Z t i c\ 6 GRANTOR /U~i<s~zl r ZJrl u*.J--*" 
-JIAROLD FREDRICKSON 
--^rr^v. Nor.ry Pv' - * 
* A r > - S ^ « i DAVID \\ UZ / * , - i / 
STATE OF UTAH ) •&'&£&£& 1B7Wes!Uoec-i a ( ^ t . ~ ^ / - ' t '/^tS*o~ 
I'L^Urjnc ) ' V V ^ a P ^ V f/y Commission E-?-.3 J sU.yt.sy / "*'y< c 
COl JNTY OFHi.^TrVi h , \ ^ . . **' « r t 23 i r 3 \ • •> 
i J^<L^^ Sjtso/Utan I ^ ' M *"J ,wVV / / 
r . Before me, the undersigned a Notary Public, within and for said County and State, on this ty~ day of 
\)s.t?t'/\')rC »19 *1U personally anpeared /jf.t^U $ A cS rtc /*S o ^ to rne personally known 
to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that // c 
execu^d ihr n m c ps ' free nnd vnltintirv'"' , ' " ^ d"-d for the w* nnd nt»"->o«;f< tNrmn «et r->r*h 
Dated ft- ft ~?6 
Notary PuWic ^ 
DAVID R. NEIISC*' I 
187 W«*t Lagoon Slrcc l 
£*>c**v»h. Utah C4COG ! 
MyCommbiionExp.rc: I WITNESSED BY 
Anr9 2S.19M 1 
State o< Utah , 
GRANTEE 
CHANDLER & ASSOCIATES INC 
1 -MRei lELLL SOLICIT 
'-^-PRESIDENT 
STAT C OF COLORADO 
CITY AND 
COUNTY OF DENVER 
/ V.P."^OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION 
xy%X-*-r'' D.M (Don) J o h n s o n , V . P 
T?i^(bVcgmif».instrornent was ackno \ edged before me th.a day / ? * " dnv of 3cr<~ I9?£. b> M^beU-^-Sphch 
PtxN^8H^h3j i iJe"r & Associates, ' \c 
• <?-' ( j - ITN^S my hand and oifbml seal 
M\ comuffaion expires / J - J / - 7 ? 
J 
Not . rx Public 
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